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[L. A. No. 22312.

In Bank. July '1, 1953.]

NAN VICTORIA TRUE CONNOR, Respondent, v. PAUL
J. GROSSO et aI., Appellants.

)

[1] K1lSband and Wife-Liability for Torta.-Mere fact that one
defendant is wife of other and holds property with him as a
joint tenant does not establish her liability for a tort committed by him.
[2&. SIb] Trespass-Evidence.-Where evidence relating to amount
of dirt, rocks and other debris dumped on plaintiff's property
indicates that some of such material was dumped by persons
other than defendants, a finding that defendants dumped all
of it is without support.
[8] Id.-Evidence.-Where there is a conflict of evidence as to
amount of dirt dumped on plaintiff's property, trier of fact
could resolve such conflict in favor of plaintiff.
[4] Id.-Damages.-A defendant sued for damages for injuries to
real property should be required to pay cost of removing any
slippage that may reasonably occur in course of removing dirt
and other debris which he dumped on plaintiff's property.
[6] Id.-Parties.-Where defendant in dumping dirt on plaintiff's
land, did not act in concert with other persons dumping dirt
on plaintiff's land, he cannot be required to pay for removal
of dirt dumped by them.
[6] New Trial-Award as to Pan of Issues-Damages.-Where
defendant has had a fair trial on issue of liability for dumping
dirt on plaintiff's property, the findings on that issue are amply
supported by the evidence, and the only issue on which a
[1] Liability of wife for husband's torts by virtue of mere
ownership of property in connection with which tort occurred,
note, 12 A.L.B. 1459, 1463. See, also, Oal.Jur., Husband and Wife,
§ 6; Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 487.
[6] See Oal.Jur., New Trial, § 16; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 21 et seq.
McK.DIg. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 13; [2, S] Trespass, § 24; [4] Trespass, § 26; [5] Trespass, I U; [OJ New TriaI,

,lU

230

CONNOR V. GROSSO

[41 C.2d

judgment for plaintiff is not supported by the evidence is the
amount of compensatory damages, a new trial may be ordered
only as to issue of such damages.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for damages for injuries to real property. Judgment
against defendant Madolyn A. Grosso reversed with directions
that judgment be entered in her favor; judgment against defendant Paul A. Grosso reversed with directions for retrial on
issue of compensatory damages only.
W. P. Smith and Henry F. Walker for Appellants.
Stanton, Stanton & Welbourn for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, d.-This action was consolidated for trial with
Herzog v. Grosso, ante, p. 219 [259 P.2d 429]. The trial
court found that defendants Paul Grosso and Madolyn Grosso
deposited 3,184 cubic yards of material on plaintiff Nan
Connor's property and entered judgment against both defendants for $4,362.08.
Defendant Madolyn Grosso contends that the award of
damages against her is not supported by the evidence. • We
agree. [1] The fact that Paul Grosso was her husband
and that he held the pl'operty with her as a joint tenant does
not establish her liability. (Goldman v. House, 93 Cal.App.
2d 572, 576 [209 P.2d 639] ; Oitizens State Bank v. Hoffman.
44 Cal.App.2d 854, 855 [113 P.2d 211].) In Brown v. Oztoby,
45 Cal.App.2d 702, 709 [114 P.2d 622], and similar cases relied
upon by plaintiff, there was evidence that the wife actively
participated in the tort, or that the husband acted as her
agent, or that she ratified his conduct. Plaintiff pleaded a
cause of action against Madolyn Grosso, but no evidence was
introduced to support her allegations, although the case was
vigorously contested and on trial for seven days. The trial
court will therefore be directed to enter judgment for Madolyn
Grosso. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53; see Burtis v. Universal Piclures Co., Inc., 40 Cal.2d 823, 835 [256 P.2d 933].)
[2a] The trial court found that defendants "dumped upon
-In the companion cue of Henog ~. GroB,o, Ollt., p. 819 [859 P.Bcl
'S9], the award of damages was against Paul GI'OIIIO onl7.
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said real property of plaintiff 3,184 cubic yards of dirt, rocks
and other debris" and that the "cost of removal of said
material so unlawfully dumped upon said real property of
plaintiff, including slippage necessarily incidental to such
removal, is the sum of $4,362.08." Defendants' contention
that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence is
sustained by the record. Before defendants acquired their
property, a considerable amount of dirt had already been
dumped on the Connor property by Herzog and Mrs. Schneider
in the course of building the road on parcel 3, filling in the
ground near the telephone pole, and leveling land between
the road on parcels 2 and 3 and the road to the top of the
hill. Defendants acquired the hilltop property in March,
1949. Defendant Paul Grosso dumped dirt on the Connor
property in November, 1949, when he regraded his road, and
again in September. 1950, when he built the ramp across the
fill.
[3] One witness, Bert Willis, testifi,~d that to restore the
Connor property to its natural condition by removing all
of the fill and the dirt that would fall in upon removal
thereof, would require excavation of 3,184 cubic yards of
dirt at a cost of $4,362.08.- Another witness. Kenneth Cook,
testified that the last fill, in September, 1950, amounted to
1,570% yards. According to Willis, removal of 1,570% yards
would cost $2.625.84. Witnesses called by defendants testified
that Grosso dumped only 150 yartls of dirt on the Connor
property but the trier of fact could, of course, resolve the
conflict in the evidence in favor of plaintiff. Neither party
introduced evidence showing the depreciation in value of
plaintiff's property caused by the dumping of the dirt.
[4] Defendant, of course, should be required to pay the
cost of removing any slippage that may reasonably occur in
the course of removing the material that he dumped on plain·Willis testified that he based his computation on the amount of 1Illed
ground lying between the red line and the dotted line on plaintiff'8 ell:'
hibit C·2. That exhibit is a survey map prepared by witness Cook. He
testi1led that the red linc represented the boundary between the COUDor
property and parcels 2 and 3, and that the dotted line indicated the
bottom of the fill on the Connor property. Cook stated that he dug four
test holes in the fll1 and concluded that only part of the dirt in the 1111
could be attributed to the last dumping on the Connor land.
The trial court asked Willis, "I take it from your testimony 80 far,
Mr. Willis, that what you are conveying is that it would require the
removal of 3,184 yard8 to restore the Connor property to its origiftal
grouftd level." (Emphasis added.) The witness replied, "That is right.
air."
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tiff's property. The evidence, viewed most favorably to plaintiff, shows that Grosso actually dumped 1,570% cbbic yards
of material on plaintiff's property and that to remove all the
fill, including material dumped by other persons, plus the
dirt that would slide down the hill from parcels 2 and 3 during such removal, it would be necessary to excavate 3,184
cubic yards. There is no evidence that the material previously
dumped by other persons, lying under the dirt subsequently
dumped by Grosso, would have to be removed in order to
remove the dirt dumped by him. Nor is there any evidence
to show the amount, of dirt that will slide down the hill
if only the 1,570% yards dumped by Grosso were removed.
[5] Since Grosso did not act in concert with the other persons dumping dirt on the Connor land, he cannot be required
to pay for removal of the dirt dumped by them. (Slater v.
Pacific American Oil Co., 212 Cal. 648, 654 [300 P. 31];
Prosser, Torts, p. 333.) [2b] The judgment holds Grosso
responsible for all the dirt· fill on the Connor property and is
thus without adequate support in the evidence.
[6] Defendant argues that the error in the award of
damages requires a complete new trial. After a lengthy
trial, the trial court resolved the question of liability in favor
of plaintiif and the question of exemplary damages in favor
of defendants. The only issue on which the judgment is not
supported by the evidence is the amount of compensatory
damages, and we are of the opinion that a separate trial on
that issue will expedite the administration of justice and will
not deny defendant Paul Grosso a fair trial, for he has already
'had a fair trial on the issue of liability, and the trial court's
findings on that issue are amply supported by the evidence.
The judgment against defendant Madolyn A. Grosso is
reversed, and the trial court is directed to enter judgment
in her favor. The judgment against defendant Paul A.
Grosso is reversed, and the trial court is directed to retry
the issue of compensatory damages only. Madolyn Grosso
shall recover her costs on appeal. The other parties shall
bear their own costs.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk,. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. I take particular exception to
the order directing the trial court to enter judgment in favor
of Madolyn Grosso. Even if we can properly conclude that
the evidence on this record is insufficient to support the
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judgment against her we have no right to assume that on a
new trial no additional evidence against her could be produced.
. It further appears to me to be inaccurate to state in the
opinion that "The only issue on which the judgment is not
supported by the evidence is the amount of compensatory
damages . • ." and at the same time to order a new trial on
the issue of the amount of compensatory damages as against
Paul Grosso while directing a judgment in favor of Madolyn.
In my view, on the state of the record, and on the facts
and law stated in the majority opinion, there should be a
complete new trial on all issues as to all parties.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I think it is clear that the evidence is sufficient to support
the award of damages and a new trial on that issue should
not be ordered.
The majority opinion proceeds upon the theory that plaintiff was not entitled to the cost of removing more dirt than
was actually dumped on her property even though it would
require the removal of the additional amount to effectively
remove the amount dumped and that there is no evidence
that the removal of the additional amount was necessary to
effectively remove the amount dumped.
The first proposition is manifestly untenable. It is the
same as saying in a case where plaintiff was entitled to damages for an injury to the motor of his car that he could recover for the damage to the motor but not the expense of
repairing it where part of the cost of repair was the removal
and replacement of other .parts although necessary to repair
the motor. The evidence clearly supports the necessity of removing the additional soil.
The majority holds that there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court's finding that defendant Grosso
dumped 3,184 yards of soil on plaintiff's property and hence
damaged her in the sum of $4,367.08, being arrived at by
computing the cost of removal of the dirt at $1.37 per yard.
There is enough evidence, on the. theory that while the total
yardage of soil dumped on plaintiff's land may have been
1,570~ instead of 3,184, it would require the removal of the
latter amount because to remove effectively the 1,570 yards,
an additional amount, up to the 3,184 yards, must be removed because of the sliding of other soil onto plaintiff's
land ·as the result of removing the 1,570 yards.

)
234

)

-"

)

CONNOR

11.

GROSSO

[41 C.2d

While Cook testified that 1,570 yards had been dumped
on plaintiff's land, plaintiff's expert (Willis) on removal of
the soil and the cost thereof, testified:
"Q. Now, at my request, Mr. Willis, did you make an estimate of the amount of filled ground represented on this map
that I have referred to, Plaintiffs' Exhibit C-2, that lies between the Connor property line or the red line and the mark
with the dotted line entitled •Toe of spill from road'" J
"THE COURT: What end'
"MR. STANTON: Well, all the ground enclosed within that
curved line and the red line.
" A. Yes, I did, but in addition to that I went back to the
naturaZ contour of the land. You couldn't excavate it to
your property line without .'tliding back of your property
line, so we went back of the property line to the original con·
tours of the hill.
"Q. Why did you do that, Mr. Willis' A. To excavate at a
vertical line at the property line, you couldn't hold the ma·
terial above it,you would slide down into the property.
"Q. In other words, in making your estimate of yardage,
you had in mind the removal of that dirt. Is that correct'
A .. That is right.
"Q. Then if you removed right along the property line,
it is your best estimate that the other dirt would fall into
place and that would have to be removed as well' A. That
is right.
"Q. Now, you were asked to estimate the amount of cubic
yards of dirt necessary to remove along that property line,
were you not' A. That is right.
"Q. What was your estimate of the total number of cubic
yards of earth' A. 3184 cubic yards.
"Q. That includes not only the amount of earth in the flll
itself, but also the yardage of earth which you estimate would
fall into the fill, were the present flll in the Connor property
removed t A. Yes." (Emphasis added.)
"THE COURT: I take it from your testimony so far, Mr.
Willis, that what you are conveying is that it would require
the removal of 3184 yards to restore the Connor property'
to its original ground level."
That testimony is at least reasonably susceptible of the
construction that in order to remove the soil dumped on the
land by Grosso it would be necessary to remove the soil to
the original contour of the land because otherwise if you
removed only the part dumped, other soil would slide down
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leaving soil on the property the same as before; that to remove all of the soil necessary to restore plaintiff's land, 3,184
yards must be removed. This is in accord with the finding
of the trial court.
This being the state of the record, there is ample evidence
to support the finding of the trial court as to the amount
ef damages suffered by plaintiff and the judgment should,
therefore, be affirmed.
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